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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TODD ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920754-CA 
Priority No. 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix I to this reply brief contains the full text of 
the following controlling constitution and statutory provisions: 
Article I, § 7, Constitution of Utah (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
Article I, § 12, Constitution of Utah (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
Amendment VI, U.S. Constitution (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution (1992 Repl. Vol.). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(b) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.2(1) (1192 Repl. Vol.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sentencing judge may only impose as criminal 
restitution those special damages which could be recovered in a 
civil action Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4) (b) . Therefore, the trial 
judge may not impose full requested restitution when the amount of 
restitution is disputed until civil defenses to recovery which are 
asserted by the criminal defendant are fully litigated, either 
civilly or in a restitution hearing. The sentencing judge's 
imposition of full restitution and refusal to consider 
Mr. Robinson's civil defense to recovery of damages was error. 
The sentencing judge did not adequately consider the 
statutory criterion for imposition of restitution Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-201(4) (b) (1992 as amended) . The sentencing judge must state 
clearly the facts she relies upon to conclude Mr. Robinson has the 
future ability to pay both the full amount of $13,567.87 and that 
Mr. Robinson has the ability to pay that amount at a rate of $20.00 
per month. 
POINT I: The trial Judge must consider civil issues if 
it orders full restitution and the restitution 
amount is disputed. 
The state misconstrues Appellant's argument in it's 
brief. Appellant is not arguing that trial judges must always 
litigate all civil claims before it is able to impose restitution; 
rather, the trial Judge may not impose full restitution when the 
amount of restitution is in dispute until civil defenses to 
recovery asserted by the defendant are fully litigated. In 
Mr. Robinson's case, the trial Judge refused to consider the civil 
defense to recovery of the release of liability and yet the trial 
court imposed full restitution despite the existence of the 
release. There is no indication that the legislature intended for 
criminal restitution to be imposed when civil recovery would be 
barred. 
In it's brief the state attempts to distinguish the words 
"could recover", as used in the restitution statutes, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-201(4)(b), from the words "should recover". The state 
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argues that if the legislature had meant for civil claims to be 
fully litigated in restitution, it would have said "would" and not 
"could". However, this is a distinction without substance. There 
is no basis to support the assertion that the legislature 
consciously chose one word over another. 
The position appellant advocates is that the trial court 
impose only that restitution which is both easily measurable and 
that clearly could be recoverable in a civil action; for example, 
when no civil defense is presented, and leave the remaining amount 
in dispute to full civil litigation and collection in accordance 
with that outcome. 
Any other procedure would result in automatic imposition 
of the highest possible amount of restitution and the defendant 
must then sue in civil court. If the defendant receives a 
favorable result in civil court then he goes back to the trial 
Judge and attempts to have criminal restitution altered 
accordingly. 
Three major problems exist with this procedure. First, 
it requires a defendant to litigate civilly, including incurring 
costs of filing fees and hiring of counsel, in order to get an 
accurate restitution amount in line with what would be imposed in 
civil court. This requirement forced on a criminal defendant would 
violate due process as well as right to counsel since counsel would 
not be appointed for civil litigation if Mr. Robinson could not 
afford to hire counsel. See United States Constitution, Amendment 
XIV, and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, as well as Utah 
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Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and United States 
Constitution, Amendment VI. Furthermore, the legislature did not 
intend this result. In Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(3)(c) it states 
"if the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of restitution, the court shall, at the time of the 
sentencing, allow him a full hearing on the issue". The 
legislature has created an opportunity for a defendant to be fully 
heard on restitution or at least show the trial judge civil issues 
exist which should limit criminal restitution. 
Second, as a practical matter a defendant like 
Mr. Robinson cannot initiate a civil suit himself. Assuming that 
Mr. Robinson brought a breach of contract action against the 
Thompsons, it appears he could not introduce crucial evidence with 
respect to the contract (the release) and the i~esulting damages. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201.2(1) states that evidence that a defendant 
has been ordered to pay restitution is not admissible in a civil 
action "arising out of the facts or events which were the basis of 
the restitution." At the very least, Mr. Robinson's amount of 
damages would be inadmissible in his civil action. 
When the Thompsons breached the contract by seeking an 
amount over what the parties agreed in the release satisfied all 
claims, the resulting damage is the restitution Mr. Robinson was 
ordered to pay. Therefore, both the fact that the Thompsons sought 
an amount over $400.00 in the restitution hearing as well as the 
amount Mr. Robinson was ordered to pay are crucial to 
Mr. robinson's civil claim. The inadmissibility of such evidence 
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renders any civil action useless to Mr. Robinson. Moreover, the 
civil courts do not have jurisdiction to affect criminal 
restitution amounts. So if Mr. Robinson could as a practical 
matter sued in civil court and prevailed in civil court he would 
have to take that civil order back to the criminal trial Judge and 
attempt to get restitution altered, however, the civil court cannot 
force the criminal court to comply. 
Third, because of the potential inadmissibility of 
evidence, the only realistic way for Mr. Robinson to be heard on 
his defense is to hope that the Thompsons initiate suit against him 
and he can assert the breach of contract in response. However, it 
is unlikely the Thompsons will invest the money and effort in a 
civil action against Mr. Robinson when they are promised $13,567.87 
in restitution with a jail term inevitable if Mr. Robinson wilfully 
fails to pay. Furthermore, since criminal restitution obligations 
are not releasable by bankruptcy, the Thompsons benefit by 
collecting criminally. 
POINT II: The sentencing Judge must do more than recite the 
restitution statute in court, she must state on the 
record the facts which support her finding that 
Mr. Robinson has the ability to pay restitution requested 
by the State. 
The state in it's brief indicates that the trial judge 
read in open court the restitution statute and, therefore, the 
court applied and considered the proper criteria in it's decision 
to impose restitution. 
Appellant's position is that the court never made 
specific findings that Mr. Robinson has the ability to pay 
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$13,567.87. The court did not state on the record what information 
it relied on in determining that Mr. Robinson was able to pay. The 
trial judge has a responsibility to support her findings to enable 
this court to fully review the basis of her ruling. The trial 
judge found that Mr. Robinson could pay $20.00 a month toward that 
figure but she did not record the information which supported that 
finding. The trial judge also did not provide the factual basis 
which supported her determination that Mr. Robinson had the ability 
to pay, into the future, the total amount of $13,567.87 as ordered. 
Therefore, the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge 
actually applied the statutory standard to the facts presented at 
the hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's restitution order. 
DATED this /0nd day of July, 1993. 
SUSAN M. DENHARDT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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DELIVERED this day of July, 1993. 
7 
APPENDIX I 
76-3-201 CRIMINAL CODE 
Section 
76-3-201. 
76-3-201.2. 
76-3-203.1. 
76-3-203.2. 
76-3-203.3. 
CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENTS 
Part 2 
Sentencing 
Sentences or combination of 
sentences allowed — Civil 
penalties — Restitution — 
Definitions — Resentencing 
— Aggravation or mitigation 
of crimes with mandatory 
sentences. 
Civil action by victim for dam-
ages. 
Offenses committed by three or 
more persons — Enhanced 
penalties. 
Definitions — Use of firearm in 
offenses committed on or 
about school premises — En-
hanced penalties. 
Penalty for hate crimes — Civil 
rights violation. 
Section 
76-3-206. 
76-3-207. 
76-3-207.5. 
Capital felony — Penalties. 
Capital felony — Sentencing 
proceeding. 
Applicability — Effect on sen-
tencing — Options of of-
fenders. 
Part 3 
Fines and Special Sanctions 
76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
Part 4 
Limitations and Special Provisions on 
Sentences 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of of-
fense. 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and 
diagnostic evaluation — 
Commitment of defendant — 
Sentencing procedure. 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 
77, Chapter 30, or has been transported at governmental expense 
from one county to another within the state for the purpose of resolv-
ing pending criminal charges and is adjudged guilty of criminal ac-
tivity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defen-
dant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether restitu-
tion is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection 
(3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution 
to the Division of Finance. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activ-
ities. 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201.2 
into consideration the sentencing guidelines 
established under this section by the Commis-
sion on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for 
"comply with the sentencing rules of the Judi-
cial Council" in the second sentence in Subsec-
tion (6)(a); and made stylistic and punctuation 
changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, added Subsections (l)(e) and (f) and re-
designated former Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g); 
subdivided Subsection (4)(d); substituted 
"takes precedence over" for "supersedes" in 
Subsection (6)(c); and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
Cross-References. — Commission on Crim-
inal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Aggravating factors. 
—Severity of offense. 
Restitution. 
—Findings. 
Review. 
Statement of reasons for sentence. 
Aggravating factors. 
—Severity of offense. 
When the trial judge considered the severity 
of the offenses "together with" additional ag-
gravating factors, any error in citing the sever-
ity of the offenses as an aggravating factor was 
harmless. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1990). 
Restitution. 
—Findings. 
Case was remanded for supplementary find-
ings on the questions of restitution and respon-
sibility for attorney fees, together with such 
additional proceedings as might be necessary 
to permit the making of adequate findings, 
where there was no record to demonstrate com-
pliance with Subsection (3)(b). State v. Hasten, 
811 P.2d 929 (Utah 1991). 
Review. 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal 
unless the trial court has abused its discretion. 
State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991). 
Statement of reasons for sentence. 
Trial court fully complied with the proce-
dures required by this section when it identi-
fied the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances prior to sentencing, and made clear the 
reason for the sentence of middle severity: the 
aggravating circumstances did not outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances. State v. Elm, 
808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Binding Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's 
Prison Population, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 309. 
76-3-201.2. Civil action by victim for damages. 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the 
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and re-
cover damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defen-
dant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or Section 
77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or 
events which were the basis for the restitution. However, the court shall 
credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment 
in favor of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defen-
dant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively 
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201.2, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 69, § 3; 1989, ch. 187, § 4; 1990, ch. 
163, §§ 4, 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, amending this section as amended by L. 
1989, ch. 187, effective July 1, 1990, substi-
tuted "Section 77-18-1" for "Rule 17, Utah 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C J . S . — 16A CJJS. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
AJL.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.LJt3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of light to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
CJ .S . — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 82; 
Weapons <*=» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industnal commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
AX.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
AJLJUth 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
*» 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
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Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive lines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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